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NOTES
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
EMPLOYEE FRINGE BENEFITS
The Department of the Treasury has recently issued a discus-
sion draft of the first comprehensive regulations I dealing with the
taxation of benefits received by employees from goods, services,
facilities, or reimbursements provided by employers.' Although
the language of section 6i (a) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which defines gross income as including "all income from whatever
source derived," a and the interpretation of this language by the
Supreme Court,4 are broad enough to allow taxation of most of
the employment benefits dealt with in the draft regulations,5 these
I "Incidental facilities, goods, and services benefitting the employee," Proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.6i-i6 (discussion draft) [hereinafter cited as Draft Treas. Reg.],
4o Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975); P-H 1975 FED. TAXES J 8907, at 77,621. For the
Treasury's analysis of its draft regulations, see Summary and Examination of Dis-
cussion Draft of Proposed Regulations on Fringe Benefits, P-H 1975 FED. TAXES
ff 8907, at 77,615 (issued Sept. 3, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Treas. Exam.].
The Treasury invited comments on its draft regulations; among the most useful
responses are Ault, Kurtz, McDaniel & Surrey, Comments on Discussion Draft of
Proposed Regulations on Employee Fringe Benefits; Georgetown Univ. Institute
for Public Interest Representation, Comments on Regulations Proposed by the
Department of the Treasury Relating to Income Tax Treatment of Certain Fringe
Benefits (Jan. I976) [hereinafter cited as Comments, Inst. for Pub. Interest
Repres.]; N.Y. State Bar Assoc., Report on Discussion Draft of Proposed Fringe
Benefit Regulations (Dec. 1975) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. Bar Rep.].
2 Concern about the issue of exclusion of incidental employment benefits from
gross income may have been stimulated by the publicity attending former President
Nixon's use, for purposes which often appeared personal, of goods and services
provided by the Government. A congressional investigation concluded that the
former President received gross income from certain of these uses. See JOINT COMM.
ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, EXAMINATION OF PRESIDENT NIxoN's TAX RE-
TURNS FOR z969 THROUGH 1972, S. REP. No. 768, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 163, 200-01
(1974) [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT NixoN's TAXES].
2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6i(a).
'See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (i955) ("Con-
gress applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, no restrictive
labels as to their nature. And the Court has given a liberal construction to this
broad phraseology in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains ex-
cept those specifically exempted."). See also Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S.
243 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (statute "is broad
enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred
on the employee as compensation"). Although the Treasury apparently interprets
Smith as restricting taxable employment benefits to those which are intended as
compensation, see Treas. Exam., supra note I, at 77,619, Smith's language is not
necessarily exclusive, and the later Glenshaw Glass case has clearly established a
broader interpretation, see PRESIDENT NixoN's TAXEs, supra note 2, at 158; N.Y.
Bar Rep., supra note x, at 5-12.
a The draft regulations would generally allow the exclusion from gross income
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regulations would continue, for the most part, the present admini-
strative practice of generally excluding incidental employment
benefits from gross income.6 This Note analyzes the difficulties
inherent in taxation of employer-provided benefits and reimburse-
ments, focusing on the analogous issues raised by the deduction of
employment expenses. The Treasury Department's attempted
resolution of these difficulties is evaluated, and alternative rules
are suggested which provide both fairer and simpler treatment.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A. Objectives of Taxation
Fundamental notions of proper public policy suggest that the
objectives of equity and efficiency should be pursued to the extent
administratively feasible in the development and implementation
of any tax system. These objectives reflect the basic beliefs that
government endeavors should encourage the efficient allocation
of resources and should afford like treatment to individuals except
to the extent warranted by their different situations.
Equity has two distinct components: horizontal equity and
vertical equity. Horizontal equity may be defined as equivalent
tax treatment of individuals who receive the same amount of
income.7 This objective requires that employment benefits re-
ceived in kind not be taxed differently from cash benefits; it may
be difficult, however, to ascertain what constitutes equivalent treat-
ment of cash and in-kind benefits.8 This requirement is espe-
cially significant because the availability of fringe benefits is likely
to vary greatly among jobs. Horizontal equity also requires that
the taxability of an item used for trade or business purposes not
depend on whether it is furnished by the employer, whether the
employer reimburses the individual for his expense in obtaining the
item, or whether the individual personally bears the item's cost.
Thus, considerations of horizontal equity suggest that an employ-
of, inter alia, free airline flights, retail discounts, schooling for employee children,
automobiles, parking facilities, supper money, and taxi fare provided by the em-
ployer. See Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6a-i6(f), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118.
6 See Treas. Exam., supra note I, at 77,619 ("The general rules of the proposed
regulations excluding benefits inherent in the employer's business under certain
circumstances deal with a category of clear economic benefits that have not been
generally taxed.").
ISee H. SixoNs, FEDERAL TAX RExOaR 8-12 (I950) (equity requires similar
taxation of persons in similar circumstances).
' The major difficulty in attaining consistent treatment of cash and in-kind
benefits is measurement of the amount of income obtained from an in-kind benefit.
See p. II44 infra. The same problem may arise with respect to deductions. See
P. 1146 infra.
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ment benefit should be excluded from gross income only if the
employee could have deducted its cost had he paid for it himself.
Vertical equity refers to the tax treatment of persons with
different amounts of income. Under a progressive income tax sys-
tem vertical equity requires that those with higher incomes pay a
higher proportion of their incomes in taxes. Exclusion from tax-
able income of all fringe benefits would be regressive if such bene-
fits constitute a greater proportion of total compensation in higher
income occupations. Indeed, this may be the case, both because of
the nature of executive and professional life and because the
highly-compensated have a greater opportunity to structure the
form of their remuneration.'0
Allocative inefficiency-inefficiency in production and con-
sumption - will result if only some forms of economic benefits are
taxed, because the after-tax prices of the benefits will not reflect
their true relative value to society." That is, the relative costs of
goods will be altered while the real resources in the production of
various goods and the benefits obtained from them will not change.
Taxed goods will be underconsumed; untaxed goods will be over-
consumed. Consumers of taxed goods will be subsidizing con-
sumers of untaxed goods. For instance, if employer reimburse-
ments for restaurant meals were excluded from income, but the
amount spent by employees who eat dinner at home were not de-
ductible from gross income, 2 the price to an employee of restau-
rant meals relative to that of home meals would be decreased, re-
sulting in excess consumption of restaurant meals and under-
consumption of home meals. More generally, if all in-kind bene-
fits provided by employers were excluded from gross income, two
types of distortion would occur. First, more in-kind compensation
and less cash compensation would be provided. Second, labor
would shift to those occupations which are especially amenable to
the provision of fringe benefits.
I See H. SimoNs, supra note 7, at 8-12 (equity requires that tax rates be pro-
gressive).
10 Unions also have substantial bargaining power to structure the form of em-
ployee compensation. To the extent that the poorest workers are nonunionized,
however, this only accentuates problems of vertical equity.
11 Thus, the practical inability to tax leisure and psychic income gives an added
incentive to enjoy leisure and to engage in employment with psychic benefits. See
H. SIMON, PERSONA. INcOM TAXATION 52-53 (x938). The egalitarian theorist
would advocate giving fewer employment benefits to those with more absorbing
work. See THE EcoNomisT, Dec. 13, 1975, survey at I3 (Governor Brown of
California suggesting that janitors be paid more than judges, since the latter have
the more interesting work).
12The draft regulations would exclude reimbursements of amounts spent on
supper by late-working employees. See Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6z-A6(f) (8), 4o Fed.
Reg. 41,118 (1975). See p. 1166 infra.
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Considerations of administrative feasibility require that the
objectives of equity and efficiency be pursued through the formula-
tion of criteria which give the employer and employee clear guide-
lines as to the taxability of various benefits and which do not pre-
sent difficult problems of valuation. These administrative con-
siderations impose significant constraints on the attainment of the
objectives set forth above.
B. A Model for Optional Taxation of Fringe Benefits and
Employment Expenses
Complete equity and efficiency would require taxation of all
economic benefits which a taxpayer obtains from his employment."8
When these benefits are rendered in kind, the ideal basis for their
taxation would be the reduction in cash compensation which the
employee would be willing to accept in return for provision of the
benefit. Only if the basis for taxation is this "employee cash
valuation" of in-kind compensation will the employee's relative
valuation of cash and in-kind benefits be unchanged before and
after imposition of an income tax, and will the amount of tax which
he pays not be dependent on the form in which he is compen-
sated.14 Employee cash valuation of in-kind compensation will
never exceed the market cost of an item, because the employee
would never be willing to "pay" his employer, by the acceptance
of reduced cash compensation, more than he would have to pay
for the item if he bought it himself. Since employee cash valuation
as defined herein will never be greater than market value, taxation
on this basis will not entail taxation of consumer's surplus.'
5
Under this neutral regime of taxation, there would be no tax
incentive to render compensation in kind. However, some compen-
sation would still be given in kind rather than in cash because of
economies which may result.' First, if an employer is able to pro-
vide a good at a cost to him below its employee cash valuation, a
"a Economic benefit - anything for which an individual would exchange cash -
is the essence of the definition of income used by many taxation theorists. See,
e.g., Haig, The Concept of Income- Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL
INcomE TAx 5-7 (R. Haig ed. 1921); H. SIMONS, PERS0AL INCOmE TAXATioN
61-62, 2o6 (1938); H. McCAuLEY, FRINGE BENEFITS AND THEIR FEDERAL TAx
TREATMENT 19--20 (1959). However, such a definition has not consistently in-
formed the federal income tax system. See Treas. Exam., supra note I, at 77,618-x9.
1 See generally Halperin, Business Deductions for Personal Living Expenses:
A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. Rv. 859, 862-64,
878-80 (1974).
15 Consumer's surplus is the difference between what an individual would be
willing to pay for a good and its market cost. Our cash-based tax system leaves
such surplus untaxed.
16 Analogously, some compensaton would still be given in the form of reim-
bursements. See pp. xx758-59 infra.
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savings will be produced equal to the difference between these
two amounts.17 The relative bargaining strengths of the employee
and the employer will determine what portion of the savings each
captures. If the employee has any bargaining power, then the
amount by which cash compensation is reduced when in-kind com-
pensation is provided will be less than the employee's cash valu-
ation of the in-kind compensation. This amount will be called the
"contribution to compensation" 11 of providing in-kind benefits to
employees.19
In-kind benefits may also be provided if an employee derives
personal enjoyment from something which serves other business
purposes of the employer; a single expenditure may be both a pay-
ment for the employee's services and a payment for another input
in the production process. For instance, a retail clothier may pro-
vide clothes free of charge to his employees in order to allow cus-
tomers to see. the clothes being modeled, as well as to provide em-
ployee compensation. Although the advertising value of this
arrangement may not justify the cost of the clothes to the em-
ployer, the employer will nevertheless provide the clothes as long
as employee cash valuation of them is greater than the difference
between their cost and their advertising value. The resulting
savings - equal to employee cash valuation minus the difference
between employer cost and advertising value - will be shared by
the employer and the employee in accordance with their relative
bargaining strengths.
Whether a fringe benefit is provided solely as compensation or
also serves other business functions, the employee should ideally
be taxed on his full valuation of the benefit. This avoids giving any
tax incentive to render compensation in kind, and is required for
17 This may be demonstrated by a numerical example. Suppose that the cost to
the employer of providing a good, which has a market value of $io per unit, is
only $5 per unit, and that the employee would be willing to pay the employer $io
for the first unit of the good, $io for a second unit, $8 for a third unit, $6 for a
fourth unit, and $4 for a fifth unit. Employee cash valuation equals $34 for four
units of the good. Employer cost in providing four units equals $20. Thus, the
savings is $i4. Four units is the optimal amount of in-kind provision of the good
since the savings resulting from any more or any fewer units is less than $14.
18 If only payments intended as compensation are taxable, see note 4 supra,
then contribution to compensation, rather than employee cash valuation, should
be taxed, because this is the amount of additional cash compensation which would
otherwise be given. However, the difference between contribution to compensation
and employee cash valuation is the amount of the in-kind savings captured by the
employee; this would appear to be encompassed by the definition of income in
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), see note 4 supra.
19 Employee cash valuation sets the upper limit on the amount by which cash
compensation may be reduced; cost to the employer sets the lower limit. When-
- ever the employer and employee share the savings, contribution to compensation
is greater than employer cost and less than employee cash valuation.
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maximization of horizontal and vertical equity. No distortion in
production results because the employer is able to deduct the full
cost of the item whether its contribution is solely compensatory,
solely related to another business purpose, or a combination of
both.2°
The problems of determining whether fringe benefits should
enter into taxable income and how they should be valued are con-
ceptually equivalent to the problems of determining whether and
to what extent employment-related expenses should be deducted
from gross income. Just as a fringe benefit may be provided for
both compensatory and noncompensatory reasons, an employee or
self-employed individual may make a purchase both because it is
useful to his trade or business and because it has consumption
value to him. When the sum of the business and personal values of
an item purchased by an employee exceeds the cost of the item, a
savings is created which is analogous to the savings resulting from
the provision of fringe benefits.
The treatment of deductions which would be optimal from the
perspectives of equity and efficiency parallels the theoretically
appropriate taxation of fringe benefits. This treatment would re-
quire that the employee who buys an item which is both business
and personal in nature should deduct the full cost of the item but
include in income the personal value of the item.21 The net effect
of this scheme would be to allow the taxpayer to deduct only the
difference between the cost of the item and its consumption value
to him.12 For instance, if an expenditure of ten dollars by an em-
ployee results in eight dollars of personal benefit, the employee
should be allowed to deduct only two dollars, regardless of the
business value of the expenditure. This result is the same as allow-
ing full deduction of the cost of the item (ten dollars) and inclu-
sion in gross income of the personal benefit obtained (eight dol-
lars).
20 INT. REv. CODE OF x954, § 62 provides that all "ordinary and necessary"
business expenses, including a reasonable amount of compensation, are deductible.
21 The personal value of the item is analogous to employee cash valuation of
an in-kind benefit, taxation of which does not entail taxation of consumer's surplus.
In the deduction analogue, however, taxation of consumer's surplus might occur.
This may be demonstrated by a numerical example. Suppose an individual could
pay $2 for a pure consumption good worth $3 to him and $4 for a pure business-
related item which has a business value (produces business income) of $5. Taxable
income would be $i: so for the consumption good (the $x of consumer's surplus
not being taxed) and $i for the business item ($5 business income minus a $4 busi-
ness deduction). If the individual instead pays the initial $6 for a dual purpose
good which results in $3 in consumption value and $5 in business value, he would
pay tax on $2 of income under the approach discussed in text: $3 in personal valu-
ation plus $5 in business income minus a $6 deduction.
.22 This is also the result reached by Halperin, supra note 14, at 863.
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However theoretically appealing it might be to tax employee
cash valuation of all employment benefits, whether obtained in the
form of in-kind benefits or from deductible business expenditures,
there exist serious conceptual and administrative obstacles to
implementation of this principle. The major conceptual difficulty
is a "baseline" problem: employment benefits must be conceived
as the incremental well-being which employment provides above
some base level of welfare, but there is no uniquely preferable base
to select.3 For example, an employee working outdoors in Minne-
apolis might be expected to be paid more in cash compensation
than an employee in Santa Barbara doing the same job, because
the employee in Minneapolis must endure severe cold. If the
Santa Barbara employee is not taxed on the personal benefit which
he derives from working in Santa Barbara warmth rather than
Minneapolis cold - that is, on the increase in cash compensation
which he would demand if he had to work in extreme cold- it
could be argued that horizontal inequity results because the Minne-
apolis employee is paying more tax although he receives the same
net benefit as the Santa Barbara employee. Still, it would be in-
correct to conclude that the theoretically correct baseline tem-
perature is simply the lowest temperature endured by an employee,
for it is conceivable that some individual might prefer this to a
higher temperature. Inevitably the conceptually ideal baseline
for measuring benefits obtained from employment is dependent
upon the peculiar nature of each person's preference structure. 4
A specific instance of the baseline problem arises with respect
to psychic income -the cash valuation of satisfaction obtained
from the performance of one's job. If psychic income is not
"3 When he was counsel to the CIO, Arthur Goldberg described this problem
as the dichotomy between (taxable) "compensation" and (nontaxable) "condi-
tions of employment," arguing that the line between the two categories depends
on "what our current conception of the relative responsibilities of employer and
employee happens to be." Goldberg, Compensation Other Than Cash (paper pre-
sented before ABA, New York, Sept. i8, 195I), quoted in S. SURREY, W. WARREN,
P. McDANIEL, & H. AULT, I FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION 139 (1972).See also J.
SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INCOME 79, 101-04 (1965) (arguing that
"[a]s the community grows richer, and the employer, rather than the employee,
increasingly comes to be regarded as the source of consumption items in kind, the
scope of (nontaxable] 'working conditions' increases"). While it may be that the
appropriate baseline changes over time, Goldberg and Sneed are not convincing in
arguing that all perceived employer responsibilities should escape taxation; pensions,
paid vacations, and payments of the minimum wage are all subject to taxation.
24 H. MCCAuLEY, supra note 13, at 69-71, has suggested that, ideally, only com-
pensation which represents a net addition to total utility should be taxed. Thus,
to the extent that compensation is paid to overcome disutilities associated with the
job, it would not be taxed. However, this does not avoid the baseline problem, for
disutility exists only in comparison with a baseline level of utility.
25 Psychic income may be considered to be negative if the individual derives
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taxed, problems of horizontal and vertical inequity result: not all
persons who receive the same amount of non-psychic economic
benefits obtain the same amount of psychic income, and the amount
of psychic income may increase more than proportionately to the
amount of non-psychic economic benefits received from employ-
ment. Moreover, the tax incentive to engage in jobs with high
psychic income causes an allocatively inefficient pattern of job
distribution. Yet, .taxation of psychic income would entail severe
conceptual, as well as administrative, difficulties because the theo-
retically justifiable baseline for measurement of this form of in-
come is the lowest possible dissatisfaction each individual could
suffer in performing his job.
Closely related to the baseline problem are three administra-
tive difficulties of attempting to measure and tax cash valuation of
all employment benefits. First, it would be very difficult to draw
up an exhaustive list of employment benefits. Second, employee
dishonesty in identifying and valuing these economic benefits
would be virtually undetectible. Finally and most importantly,
valuation of the benefits would be nearly impossible; even a tax-
payer schooled in utility theory would have little idea of how much
cash he would require in return for surrender of an employment
benefit. These difficulties raise questions concerning both the
feasibility of taxing all employment benefits on the basis of em-
ployee cash valuation, and the social and political desirability of
the intrusions on privacy which would be necessitated by such a
scheme.
Nevertheless, the administrative and conceptual constraints
which prevent the attainment of allocative neutrality and tax-
payer equity do not compel us to ignore these objectives; rather,
they may be pursued within such constraints. 2 These constraints
do impose two requirements on a personal income tax system:
first, criteria must be developed for determining which employ-
ment-related benefits will enter into taxable income; second, a
basis other than employee valuation for taxation of fringe benefits
must be used.
disutility from performing his job. Cf. H. SINoN, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
53 (1938) (discussing the problem of taxing compensation in kind received by a
Fliigeladjutant who accompanies a prince to the theater and opera but who detests
these activities).
2 6 The administrative difficulties described may not be absolute constraints;
perhaps through the use of lie detectors and other testing methods, the true employee
cash valuation of all employment benefits could be ascertained. However, even
apart from privacy considerations, the cost would doubtless be considered pro-
hibitive, because no one would consider it worth the increased equity which would
result.
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II. DETERMINING TAXABLE INCOME: CURRENT TREATMENT OF
DEDUCTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS INCOME
Since fringe benefits and employment expenses are analytically
identical, the principles governing the taxation of each ideally
should be consistent with the other in order to further efficiency
and equity and to avoid abuse. Examination of the statutory,
judicial and administrative treatment of both employment ex-
penses and fringe benefits, however, demonstrates that the former
have more often been subject to taxation than have the latter.
Perhaps as a result, the principles and rules relating to deductions
are more developed than those relating to exclusions. Even so, the
general approach to deductions results in undertaxation when com-
pared with the optimal scheme of taxation set forth in Part I.
A. Deduction of Employment Expenses
The Internal Revenue Code has been interpreted as allowing
deduction of noncapital expenditures which are "appropriate and
helpful" to the taxpayer's trade or business,27 but it does not allow
deduction of personal expenses. 8 The case law, statutes and regu-
lations relating to dual benefit expenditures have taken four ap-
proaches to reconciling the deductibility of business expenditures
and the nondeductibility of personal expenses. The basic ap-
proach, which may be called the "business rationality" test, allows
full deduction of an expenditure as long as it is appropriate and
helpful to the business - that is, to the extent the business bene-
fit alone would justify making the expenditure - even if it also
confers personal benefits. When this test cannot easily be applied,
other approaches are taken. One of these, the "primary purpose"
test, allows full deduction only if the business motivations of the
taxpayer are more important than his personal ones. Another
scheme, the "apportionment" approach, divides the expenditure
in proportion to the relative importance of its business-related
and personal components, allowing deduction only of the former.
Finally, some benefits characterized as "essentially personal" may
not be deducted at all, however great their business motivation in
particular cases.
The "business rationality" test was applied in Sanitary Farms
Dairy, Inc.,29 in which a Pennsylvania dairy farmer was allowed
to deduct as advertising expenses the full cost of an African
27 Commssioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966), construing INT. R V. CODE
OF 1954, § x62 (a) (taxpayer may deduct all "ordinary and necessary" business ex-
penses).
28 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
25 2 T.C. 463 (i955), acquiesced in, 1956-2 Cu. Bu-L. 8.
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safari.30 The court acknowledged that the taxpayer received sub-
stantial personal enjoyment from the trip, but allowed the deduc-
tion because it found that the promotional benefit obtained from
the safari could not have been purchased at a lower price by con-
ventional advertising.3 Thus, the business rationality test ignores
the personal benefit which an expenditure may also produce, per-
haps because the courts wish to avoid the valuation difficulties in-
herent in attempting to assess personal benefits obtained from dual
purpose expenditures. More likely, the disregard for personal
benefit received stems from the erroneous assumption that taxa-
tion of such benefits would discourage efficient business spending. 2
However, the failure to tax personal benefits from business-related
expenditure in fact results in distortion in production because the
relative cost of business activities which also confer personal bene-
fits is artificially reduced.
When the entire expenditure would not be justified by the busi-
ness benefit thereby obtained, a consistent application of the busi-
ness rationality test would allow deduction of the expenditure only
to the extent that it is appropriate and helpful to the production of
income. Implementation of this principle requires allocation of a
dual purpose expenditure between the portion which confers busi-
ness benefits and the portion which confers personal benefits,
allowing deduction only of the former.3 3 This extension of the busi-
ness rationality approach is followed by the regulations pertain-
ing to expenses such as meals and lodging incurred when the tax-
payer travels away from home: deduction is limited to the cost
of those meals and nights of lodging which are related to business
activities.3" Because it is assumed that such expenses do not simul-
taneously give rise to both business and personal benefits, there is
no need in determining what may be deducted to estimate the em-
30 Today these expenses would be governed by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274,
which has stricter rules relating both to the deductibility of foreign travel, see
pp. 1151-52 infra, and the deductibility of entertainment expenses, see note 4z
infra. See S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1962).
31 25 T.C. at 468 (i95g).
32 Cf. S. REP. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962) (disallowance of "valid"
entertainment expenses would discourage business transactions).
3 See p. X153 infra for the appropriate tax treatment, under the business ra-
tionality test, of expenditures on activities or items which cannot be allocated because
they simultaneously give rise to both business and personal benefits.
34 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1968). Meals are not deductible unless the tax-
payer is away from home long enough to require a sustained rest period. See id.;
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967). See also Ellery Willis Newton,
57 T.C. 245 (1971), acquiesced in, 1972-2 CUM. BULL. 2 (salesman can only
deduct automobile expenses associated with business use of car); Leroy W.
Gillis, 42 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. f 73,096 (1973) (same). Cf. John B. Condakes,
37 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. ff 68,x39, at 68-769 (1968) (partnership's expense deduc-
tion reduced by extent of personal use of car).
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ployee's valuation of personal benefits received. Rather, he simply
is disallowed deduction for the market cost he has incurred in ob-
taining those benefits which are purely personal. 5
However, when the same activity simultaneously gives rise
to personal and business benefits, allocation and valuation of dual-
purpose expenditures is particularly difficult because it is often
impossible to determine the extent to which such expenditures have
a business rationale. Thus, the tax system frequently makes rough
approximations designed to ensure that most truly "appropriate
and helpful" business expenditures can be deducted. For example,
when a taxpayer undertakes both business and personal activities
while traveling, it is not immediately clear whether his transporta-
tion costs should be considered a business or a personal expense.
Unlike hotel bills, which may be allocated on the basis of the na-
ture of each day's activity, the cost of an airplane flight has no
obvious allocative benchmark. Therefore, the regulations relating
to domestic travel use a "primary purpose" test, allowing full de-
duction of the cost of transportation when a trip is primarily for
business reasons and disallowing any deduction when a trip is
primarily for personal reasons." Under this approach, the cost
of travel may escape taxation in some cases where it would not
have been undertaken had there not been personal benefit in-
volved, and may be fully taxed in some cases where the personal
benefit would not have been great enough to justify taking the
trip.
In implementing the primary purpose approach, the regula-
tions call for examination of all the "facts and circumstances,"
but mention as an important indicator only how the taxpayer
spends his time at his destination.17 Apparently, full deduction
of the transportation cost of a week-long trip would be allowed if
four days were spent mostly on business matters. But if only three
days were spent mainly on business, none of the transportation
cost would be deductible. While the primary purpose test does pre-
vent a taxpayer from being able to deduct the cost of a vacation
during which he incidentally accomplished some business, a trip
nevertheless may easily be structured such that a majority of days
are occupied with business affairs.
It was to reduce this type of abuse 'I that Congress in 1962
created a test relating to transportation to foreign destinations
differing from the domestic primary purpose criterion. The de-
" However, it may be difficult to assess the appropriate market cost of personal
items which are obtained at a discount price because they are purchased with
business items.
"0 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1958).
11 See id. § 1.162-2(b) (2).
"
8
See S. REiP. No. 188I, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1962).
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ductibility of most foreign transportation 39 is now governed by an
apportionment approach, under which full deduction would not
be allowed even if the trip's primary purpose was the conduct
of business. Indeed, the apportionment approach, unlike alloca-
tion under the business rationality approach, only allows deduc-
tion of that fraction of an item's cost which is equal to the ratio
of the business value to the total (business and personal) value. In
general, only that proportion of the cost of foreign travel which is
equal to the proportion of days at the destination spent primarily
on business activities may be deducted.40 Of course, apportion-
ment of time between business and personal matters will not neces-
sarily correspond to the relative business and personal benefits ob-
tained from the trip. Even if only one-third of the days are spent
on personal matters, for instance, the personal benefits obtained
may justify taking the trip. However, examination of the relative
time spent on each type of activity, which is characteristic of
both the primary purpose and the apportionment approaches, may
be the only practical way in many situations to estimate the ex-
tent to which business motivations would have been sufficient for
a dual benefit expenditure."
When compared with a strict business rationality approach, the
apportionment approach may result in overtaxation, and the pri-
mary purpose test may result in either undertaxation or over-
taxation. The primary purpose test would allow full deduction
of a dual purpose expenditure when business motivation is greater
than personal motivation, while the apportionment approach
would allow deduction only of that portion of the cost equal to
the relative business value of the expenditure. When the sum
" When foreign travel is less than one week or personal activities constitute less
than 25% of total time on such travel, the "primary purpose" rules of § i.a62-2
apply. See INT. REV. CODE OF X954, § 274(c) (2).
40See id. § 274(c). The regulations provide that foreign travel is to be allo-
cated on a per day basis; that days will be considered to have been spent primarily
on business if "during hours normally considered to be appropriate for business
activity, [the] principal activity on such day was the pursuit of trade or business";
and that weekend days will in most cases automatically be considered to have
been spent on business. See Treas. Reg. § I.274- 4 (d)(2) (1964).
"' At the same time that Congress limited deduction of foreign travel expenses,
it also enacted a provision restricting the deductibility of expenditures on entertain-
ment facilities by combining the harshest aspects of the primary purpose and
apportionment approaches. Section 274(a) provides that expenditures for enter-
tainment facilities, such as country club dues payments, are entirely nondeductible
unless the taxpayer's use of the facility is primarily business-related. See INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 274(a) (i) (B). Furthermore, no expense for an entertainment ac-
tivity may be deducted unless "the item was directly related to, or in the case of
an item directly preceding or following a substantial and bona fide business dis-
cussion ...that such item was associated with, the active conduct of the tax-
payer's trade or business." Id. § 2 74(a) (i) (A).
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of business and personal benefits is greater than cost to the
taxpayer, neither of these results is the same as the result which
would be reached under the business rationality test; deduction
of the expenditure to the extent that it is appropriate and helpful
to the taxpayer's business would be less than total cost but greater
than the cost proportionate to business activities. For example,
if cost equals twelve dollars, business benefit equals ten dollars,
and personal benefit equals five dollars, ten dollars could be de-
ducted under the business rationality test. But the full twelve
dollars would be deducted under the primary purpose test, and
two-thirds of twelve dollars, eight dollars, would be deducted
under the apportionment approach.
Conversely, the primary purpose test would allow no deduc-
tion of an expenditure which is primarily personal, while the ap-
portionment approach would allow deduction of that portion of the
cost which is equal to the relative business value of the expendi-
ture. Both of these amounts are less than the deduction which
would be allowed by a strict business rationality test, under which
only the difference between cost and business benefit would be
taxed. Thus, if the business benefit in the example above were only
five dollars and the personal benefit were ten dollars, five dollars
would be deducted under the business rationality test. No deduc-
tion would be allowed under the primary purpose test, and one-
third of twelve dollars, four dollars, would be deducted under
the apportionment approach.
None of these results would be reached under the theoretically
optimal scheme set forth in Part I. As has been demonstrated,
full taxation of the personal benefits an employee obtains in mak-
ing a dual benefit expenditure would result in deduction only
of the difference between cost and personal benefit obtained.
42 If
cost equals twelve dollars and personal benefit equals five dollars,
seven dollars could be deducted; if personal benefit equals ten
dollars, two dollars could be deducted.
With respect to certain types of expenditures, determination
of the primary motivating factor or allocation into business and
personal benefits would require severe intrusions into privacy
and difficult judgments of value and relative significance. Such
difficulties may be avoided through the application of per se rules
disallowing any deductions for expenditures on specific items
which are deemed to be "essentially personal" in nature, despite
the fact that they must be made if the individual is to perform his
job properly.43 For example, the courts have held that commut-
4 2 See p. 1146 supra.
43 However, the treatment of such highly personal or virtually universal ex-
penditures is not wholly consistent. As we have seen, statutory provisions allow
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ing 44 and child care '5 expenses cannot be deducted as business
expenses, presumably because decisions of where to live and
whether to have children are choices taxpayers in similar job sit-
uations make in large part because of factors unrelated to em-
ployment.46 Allowing complete deduction might be considered
inequitable to childless taxpayers who live near their work, but
it would be administratively infeasible to develop and implement
criteria for deductibility which are based solely on the business
reasons for the expense.
Moreover, such expenditures raise a significant "baseline"
problem: where does the taxpayer's business life begin? Nearly
all people require clothing and a home away from work and are
able to choose whether or not to have children; expenditures re-
lated to these items may be necessary to allow the taxpayer to
participate in the production of income, but they are also neces-
sary to allow him to participate in other modes of consumption.
If such expenditures were deductible, so logically would be the
cost of the taxpayer's health care and even leisure activities which
refresh his energies.47 This may explain why it has been held that
work clothes which can be worn on the street are nondeductible,
48
even if they are in fact worn solely or principally at work and
would not have been purchased by the taxpayer had they not been
necessary for his job.49 Such per se rules have also been adopted
with regard to education. Educational expenditures which merely
the cost of meals to be deducted in some instances, even though it might be argued
that no expense is more universal and personal. Besides deduction of meals when
the taxpayer is away from home on business, see note 34 supra, business meals are
deductible without regard to the restrictions of § 274(a). INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 2 74(e) (i). Protection of the restaurant industry may be one reason this allow-
ance exists. Cf. S. REP. No. i88i, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962) (disallowance
of all entertainment deductions could create considerable unemployment in the
entertainment industry).
" See Fausner v. Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838 (1973); Commissioner v. Flowers,
326 U.S. 465 (I945) ; Treas. Reg. § 1i.62-2(e) (1958).
45 See Henry C. Smith, 4o B.T.A. io38 (1939), aff'd per curiam, 113 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1940) (business deduction for child care denied under predecessor of § x62).
However, certain home and child care deductions are allowed for persons not using
the standard deduction. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 214.
41 See generally Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. IND.
& CoM. L. REv. 917, 919 (973); Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Ex-
penses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Prob-
lems, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 871, 872, 876-79 (1969).
41 Cf. Bittker, The Individual as Wage Earner, N.Y.U. XXTH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1147, 1159 (1953) ("our tax structure could have treated the cost of main-
taining one's health as a business expense").
4 See Rev. Rul. 70-474, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 35.
41See Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1955); Harry J.
Sanner, 38 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 69,084 (z969).
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increase the taxpayer's proficiency in his present occupation may
be deducted. But education which qualifies the taxpayer for a
new occupation is pursued because of an essentially personal
choice of career and lifestyle and thus is nondeductible."
B. Exclusion of Fringe Benefits
While the law relating to the exclusion of employer-provided
benefits is less developed than that relating to the deduction of
employment expenses, those exclusion rules that do exist are
generally consistent with the "business rationality" approach de-
scribed above. The only statute relating to the taxation of em-
ployment benefits furnished for both compensatory and non-
compensatory reasons is section 119, which provides that meals
and certain lodging may be excluded from gross income when
they are provided on the premises of the employer for his con-
venience. 51 The regulations state that benefits are provided for the
convenience of the employer when they are given for a "substantial
noncompensatory business reason." 52 In addition, lodging is
excluded only if the employee is required to accept it as a "con-
dition of his employment," " which is interpreted in the regula-
tions as meaning that it is required in order for the employee
((properly to perform the duties of his employment." " Although
the substantial noncompensatory reason criterion literally would
seem to allow exclusion whenever the noncompensatory business
purpose is merely more than de minimis, the applications of the
criterion in both the regulations and the case law indicate that pro-
vision of meals on the employer's premises must be appropriate
and helpful in the performance of the employee's job in order to
qualify."' In the case of lodging, the "proper performance" cri-
terion of the regulations is even more clearly an analogue to the
appropriate and helpful standard. As with the business rationality
"0 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5, T.D. 6918, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 36.
"' See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § ri9. The exemption applies only to meals and
lodging furnished in kind. See Treas. Reg. § I.JI9-i(c)(2), T.D. 6745, 1964-2
Cum. BULL. 45.
" Treas. Reg. § i.iig-i(a)(2), T.D. 6745, 1964- 2 Cum. BuLL. 43 (under the
heading "meals"). Furthering employee morale or attracting employees will not be
considered a "noncompensatory reason" for providing meals. Id. § 1.ixg-i(a)(2)
(iii).
5' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 119(2).
5 Treas. Reg. § i.iig-i(b), T.C. 6745, 1964-2 Cum. BULL. 43-44. An "objec-
tive" test is used to determine whether the lodging is required for the employee's
duties. See Gordon S. Dole, 43 T.C. 697, 706 (1965), aff'd, 351 F.2d 308 (ist Cir.
1965).
" See Commissioner v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 9o6 (1967); Treas. Reg. § i.iig-i(a) (2) (ii), T.D. 6745, 1964-2 Cum. BuLL.
43-44.
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approach in the area of deductions, personal benefit to the em-
ployee is ignored as long as noncompensatory reasons justify provi-
sion of an item.5"
Employee use of company cars is the only other general class of
employer-provided benefits which has been the subject of re-
peated litigation concerning its inclusion in gross income. It is
well established that personal use, including use for commuting,
of an automobile owned and maintained by the employer produces
gross income.7 Generally, allocation analogous to that under the
business rationality test has been applied in determining the
amount of income the employee receives. After the total time the
employee uses the car is allocated between business and personal
uses, the fair rental value for the period of personal use is included
in employee gross income.58 The courts have rejected the claim that
use of a car may be simultaneously of noncompensatory business
value to the employer and of personal benefit to the employee."0
While the issue of automobile use is readily amenable to an al-
location approach because little personal enjoyment can be ex-
pected to be derived from hours spent driving on business errands,
and little business value can be expected from personal use of an
automobile, most other cases present expenditures which simul-
taneously give rise to both business and personal benefits. Gen-
erally, even when the personal benefit obtained is clearly signifi-
cant, full exclusion is allowed if the employer derives the primary
benefit from the expenditure. For instance, in United States v.
Gotcher 10 an employer of an automobile dealer was held to
have received no income from a twelve-day expense-paid trip
to Germany to tour Volkswagen facilities. The court found that
because the "primary purpose" of the trip was to induce Gotcher
to take out a Volkswagen dealership, and because Gotcher was
"required" to make the trip in order to obtain the dealership, the
personal benefit to him was "subordinate to the concrete benefits
51 It appears quite possible that items satisfying the criteria of § iig may never-
theless be compensatory. See Boykin v. Commissioner, 26o F.2d 249 (8th Cir.
1958) (value of lodging excluded under § iig even though it was regarded as part
of employee's compensation).
" See Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. fi 72,o55, at 72-244
(1972); Rodgers Dairy Co., 14 T.C. 66, 73-74 (95o), acquiesced in, 1950-2 CuM.
BULL. 4.
18 See, e.g., Gordon S. Dole, 43 T.C. 697, 707, aff'd, 351 F.2d 308 (Ist Cir.
1965); Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. fi 72,055 (1972). B14
cf. Rodgers Dairy Co., i4 T.C. 66, 73-74 (X950), acquiesced in, 1950-2 CUM. BULL.
4 (cost apparently used as measure of fair rental value).
" See Whipple Chrysler-Plymouth, 411 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. t 72,o55, at 72-244
to -245 (1972).
60o401 F.2d I18 (5th Cir. x968).
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to VW." 61 However, because Gotcher could show no business
purpose for his wife's presence on the trip, he was held to have re-
ceived taxable income in the amount of the expenses attributable to
his wife.2 And in Allen J. McDonnell,63 the tax court held that a
sales supervisor and his wife, who had been randomly chosen by
his employer to accompany contest winners on an expense-paid
trip to Hawaii, received no income because the employer sent
them on the trip for "sound business reason [s]" even though they
also enjoyed the trip. 4
In circumstances where the possibility of abuse or conferral
of personal benefits under the guise of noncompensatory business
expenses is particularly great, the courts have more often found
some basis on which to assign a specific part of the benefit to tax-
able income. Thus, when the corporation of which he was the
dominant shareholder supplied a Beverly Hills mansion to the
musician Liberace, the tax court held that only one-half of the use
of the home could be attributed to corporate business, and taxed
Liberace on one-half of its fair rental value.6 5 Similarly, the ma-
jority shareholder and executive officer of a corporation was taxed
on that portion of the cost of maintaining a yacht owned by the
corporation which the court excluded was allocable to his personal
use.
66
In most cases, however, a fair market value standard has been
used to measure the amount of income received from fringe bene-
fits,67 with taxation on the basis of out-of-pocket cost only when
this provides the best estimate of market value.6 8 Indeed, the
market value rule, which has long been in the regulations on gross
income,69 now appears to be statutorily required. Section 83,70
enacted in 1969 primarily to deal with restricted property trans-
fers, provides that any property transferred as compensation is to
be included in gross income at its fair market value, less the price
paid by the taxpayer.71 Thus the valuation issue discussed in
6' Id. at 123.
(2 See id.
03 36 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. ff 67,oi8 (1967).
"4 1d. at 67-128.
" See International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acquiesced in, 197X-2
Cum. BULL. 3. The corporation was disallowed a deduction for the expenses at-
tributable to personal use of the house, on the theory that this constituted a
dividend.
"0 See John L. Ashby, 50 T.C. 409, 418 (I968).
67 See, e.g., International Artists, Ltd., 55 T.C. 94 (1970), acquiesced in, I971-2
Cumu. BULL. 3; cases cited at note 58 supra.
08 See, e.g., United States v. Gotcher, 4o F.2d ii8 (5th Cir. 1968).
19 See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (i), T.D. 65oo.
17 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83.
71 Section 83 also provides that the employer may deduct the difference between
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Part I has been resolved in light of the practical need to tax on the
basis of a readily identifiable value, even though this may result
in overtaxation.
72
C. Deduction of Reimbursement Paid by the Employer
The courts have shown little sensitivity to the possibility of
abuse in the reimbursement of employee expenses. Nominally,
the taxation of reimbursements is governed by the rules relating
to deductions. When an employee is reimbursed for travel or
similar activities "incurred by him solely for the benefit of his
employer" for which he accounts to his employer, he need not even
report these reimbursements on his tax return.73 While the regu-
lations provide that if reimbursements exceed "the ordinary and
necessary business expenses paid or incurred by the employee,"
the employee must include the excess in income,74 the courts and
the Internal Revenue Service have generally been content to allow
all reimbursements to be excluded from taxable income .7  The
evident rationale for this posture is that reimbursement of an
expense tends to indicate its deductibility by the employee since it
has passed the "critical scrutiny of corporate officers concerned
with the elimination of needless expense." 76 Yet the potential for
disguising compensation in the form of reimbursements is identi-
cal with the potential for disguising compensation in the form of
fringe benefits. For example, an employer will reimburse the cost
of expensive lodging, even though the employee's use of a more
modest hotel room would equally serve the employer's noncom-
fair market value and the price paid by the employee. Id. § 83(d). This deduc-
tion may be inappropriate: in a competitive situation with no restrictions on the
amount of an item he can sell at a fixed price, the employer suffers no foregone
revenue as long as the price he charges his employees equals his cost.
'2 Only when the true cost of an item to the employer is equal to employee
cash valuation (the cost arrived at after subtracting any noncompensatory business
value of the item purchased) will the employee not be disadvantaged by being
taxed on fair market value or on the amount he is reimbursed. In this situation,
the employee could obtain equivalent cash compensation if he so desired, for there
is no savings resulting from employer provision of the item or reimbursement
for its cost. The fact that the employee instead receives an in-kind benefit paid for
by the employer implies that he values it at fair market value.
On the other hand, when fair market value is greater than true employer cost,
the employee's cash valuation may be less than fair market value, resulting in over-
taxation.
"7 See Treas. Reg. § x.162-I7(b) (i958).
'74 Id.
"T See Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d IO8 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 36x U.S.
885 (1959); Rev. Rul. 57-502, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 118.
6Noland v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 108, X13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
885 (I959). See also Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treatment of Em-
ployer Mandated Expenses, 7 U. Ricr. L. RaV. x, 89-go, 95 (1972).
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pensatory purposes, if the resulting contribution to compensation
more than offsets the extra cost of the lavish hotel room.
In at least one instance, however, the IRS has been more strin-
gent, applying the same test in taxing reimbursements that it
utilizes when the employee incurs an expense and is not reim-
bursed. Recent revenue rulings provide that reimbursements for
educational expenses are not deductible unless they are for job-
related courses beneficial to the student's career in the employer's
business and do not qualify him for a new trade or business."
In the area of reimbursements, as with all deductions, the diffi-
culty of determining employee valuation of the nondeductible
item is avoided because the employee is in effect simply taxed on
the cost of the item. The full taxation of nondeductible reimburse-
ments, like the taxation of fringe benefits on the basis of fair mar-
ket value, may result in overtaxation because when an individual
does not actually pay for an item, he may not value it at its market
cost.
7 8
III. THE DRAFT TREASURY REGULATIONS ON FRINGE BENEFITS
Continuing the IRS's historical practice,7" the draft regulations
exclude from taxable income many incidental employment benefits
and reimbursements."' The Treasury has explained that the diffi-
culty of valuation and the need for a "single self-executing" sys-
tem of wage withholding mandates that only fringe benefits "which
threaten the integrity of the basic system should be taxed." 8I
However, when it is determined that an item should not escape
taxation, the draft regulations would tax it at fair market value. 2
This measure of income could just as easily have been applied
to many forms of incidental employment benefits which the regula-
tions conclude should be left entirely untaxed. 3 Thus, it is likely
" See Rev. Rul. 76-7i, CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 11 6460 (March 3,
1976). Cf. Rev. Ruls. 76-65, 76-62, CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. fTIT 6451, 6454
(March 3, 1976) (direct payment by employer for job-related courses not in-
cluded in gross income).
78 See note 72 supra.
71 See note 2 supra.
"0 See Treas. Exam., supra note i, at 77,619-20 (policy considerations in de-
veloping draft regulations said to be "equity among taxpayers," "valuation prob-
lems," "withholding considerations," as well as codification of present practices
within statutory authority which is "broad but not mandatorily all-encompassing").
"I Id. at 77,620.
2 See Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(d), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
8 For example, the fair market value of commercial airline flights, retail dis-
counts, downtown parking facilities, weekend use of company cars, bar association
dues, and schooling, all of which would at times escape taxation under the draft
regulations, see id. at § i.6z-i6(f) ()-(3), (1o), (is), (I7), (i8), could easily
be determined.
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that the major policy motivation for the Treasury's uncharacter-
istic leniency in this area is found in its argument that a contribu-
tion to vertical equity would be made by giving low and middle
income taxpayers the opportunity to enjoy untaxed economic bene-
fits,84 counterbalancing the untaxed benefits which high-income
taxpayers have long been able to obtain through deduction of busi-
ness-related meals, lodging, travel, and entertainment.8
But the contribution of the draft regulations to vertical equity
is highly questionable. Vertical equity will certainly not be in-
creased between high-income claimers of deductions and lower
income taxpayers who do not enjoy fringe benefits. Moreover,
unless high-income taxpayers receive relatively less compensation
in noncash forms, the progressivity of tax rates means that high-
income persons will enjoy proportionately greater tax savings from
a policy of uniform exclusion of fringe benefits from taxable in-
come. While it is true that the regulations would subject to taxa-
tion certain notorious executive perquisites,"6 they would not tax
many noncash fringe benefits which are of advantage chiefly to the
highly compensated.87 Whether or not the regulations would
further vertical equity, they would have a deleterious effect on
horizontal equity, exacerbating the unfortunate position of tax-
payers in whatever bracket whose occupations provide them with
few opportunities to enjoy fringe benefits. Further, although the
effects of any suboptimal tax system on allocative efficiency must
remain somewhat speculative, it is likely that toleration of such
an anomaly would have adverse allocative effects. The implica-
tion of the regulations that in-kind employment benefits will not
be taxable unless, perhaps, of the sort limited to high income tax-
payers,88 will create an incentive for an employer to substitute
work-related benefits for cash compensation, 89 providing items
as fringe benefits which might not be deductible if paid for by the
employee.90
The draft regulations set forth three major rules which will
be considered seriatim: (i) a provision which generally excludes
84 See Treas. Exam, supra note x, at 77,619-2o.
s See pp. 15o-52 supra.
8 8 Personal flights by an executive on a company airplane and the use of a
chauffeur-driven limousine would be taxed. See Draft Treas. Reg. § 1.61-16(f) (5),
(9), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
87 The regulations state that taxable income might not result from employer-
provided schooling for the children of overseas employees, from monthly cocktail
parties and annual outings, or from an executive's friends and family accompany-
ing him on a business trip on a company airplane. See id. § i.6-i 6(f) (6), (17),
(1s).8 8 See examples in note 86 supra.
89 See p. II44 supra.
90 See p. x146 supra.
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from taxation benefits which an employer provides at no cost to
himself; (2) a provision which allows exclusion when warranted
by all the "facts and circumstances," and which furnishes nine
criteria for implementation of this test; and (3) a de minimis ex-
ception which is of general applicability.
A. The "No Substantial Cost" Test
The draft regulations would exclude from taxable income bene-
fits to employees from facilities, goods, or services which (i) "are
owned or under the control of the employer for purposes proper
to the conduct of the trade or business involved and are not pri-
marily intended as compensation to the employee"; (2) are made
available to employees at "no substantial additional cost" to the
employer; and (3) are supplied to all employees or to a reasonable
classification thereof."Y
The Treasury furnished no rationale for this "no cost" rule,
but did provide examples of its application. Two of these examples
will be discussed in order to illustrate both the difficulty of finding
a rationale for the rule, and the unsatisfactory results which its
implementation would yield. 2 In the first example, free flights
taken by airline attendants on a space-available basis are excluded
from taxable income.9' The other example concludes that employ-
ees of retail stores need not account for discounts which they ob-
tain on merchandise sold by their employer, as long as the price
paid is not below wholesale cost.
4
These examples make clear that the "no cost" test is not an
analogue to the "business rationality" standard for deductions. 5
Neither the airline company nor the retail store provides these
benefits as part of its optimal operation apart from the contribu-
tion to compensation resulting from the benefits. Indeed, the
flights and discounts are quite obviously supplied solely as com-
pensation." Thus, as with dual purpose expenditures, taxing them
01 Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6s-x6(a), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
02 Other examples applying the "no cost" rule would exclude airline flights
taken by travel agents at nominal cost, discounts given to interior decorators by
wholesale furniture manufacturers, free flights taken by friends and family of an
executive accompanying him on a business trip aboard a company airplane, and
weekend use of company automobiles. See id. § 1.61-i6(f)(2), (4), (6), (i5).
"a See id. § x.6i-i6(f) (i).
The congressional committee which investigated former President Nixon's taxes
concluded that he received taxable income from use by family and friends of gov-
ernment airplanes. See PRESIDENT NixoN's TAxEs, supra note 2, at 163-68.
04 See Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(f) (3), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (,975).
95 See pp. X149-5X supra.
0 Moreover, the exclusion of employer discounts from gross income, which has
been a long-standing practice of the IRS, see U.S. INT. REV. SERv., YouR FEDERAL
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would in no way discourage outlays which are appropriate and
helpful to the business; it would merely treat these forms of com-
pensation as other forms of compensation are treated.
0 7
The "no cost" rule may be an attempt to encourage use of
resources which would otherwise be wasted or which can be made
available at no additional social cost; an empty airplane seat, for
instance, represents a needless cost in social welfare." Several
considerations, however, suggest that the realization of any wel-
fare gains from the "no cost" rule is not likely. First, the regula-
tions would apparently evaluate costs only in the short term, allow-
ing opportunities for "no cost" situations to be manufactured in
order to take advantage of the savings 11 inhering in untaxed fringe
benefits.'00 Thus, an airline could increase its seating capacity
in the expectation that this would allow more compensatory flights
to be provided to employees. 10' Secondly, the allocative distor-
tions which result from leaving certain benefits untaxed 102 may be
as significant as the cost of leaving an airplane seat empty. Finally,
it is questionable whether any fringe benefits are truly costless to
an employer, ignoring their contribution to compensation. 0 3 For
INcoam TAX 32 (i968) (edited for individuals), appears directly contrary to INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 83, see p. 1157 supra.
97 See p. II44 supra.
" However, neither the draft regulations nor the examination of them by the
Treasury, see Treas. Exam., supra note i, indicates that concern for allocative
efficiency is the rationale behind the "no cost" rule.
" Apart from whatever savings may arise because employer cost is below mar-
ket value, see pp. x144-45 supra, the nontaxation of fringe benefits produces an
additional savings equal to employee valuation multiplied by the tax rate.
10 The measure of cost employed in the "no cost" rule is evidently short-run
marginal cost; generally, capital costs are ignored. But cf. Draft Treas, Reg. §
i.6i-x6(f) (xo), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975) (employee parking spaces in company-
owned garage involve "substantial additional cost" even though garage must also
be used for business deliveries and guest parking). Opportunity costs are also ig-
nored in some examples. See note xo5 infra.
'01 Similarly, a company might engage a larger airplane than would otherwise
be required if friends and family of its executives did not travel with them on busi-
ness trips. See note 92 supra.
102 See p. 1143 supra.
10' In addition to the problems discussed in text, two ambiguities in the concept
of "cost" must be considered. First, if the provision of benefits uses up real re-
sources, the benefits thereby obtained are not costless to society even if they are
provided at no cost to the employer. For example, an employer might be able to
provide free long-distance telephone service to employees at no additional cost to
himself because he pays only a fixed monthly fee for the long-distance service.
Nevertheless, the long-distance calls by employees are costly to society. Second, a
benefit should not be considered costless to the employer merely because the cost
of providing it is more than made up by its contribution to compensation. If an
item costs the employer $3o and allows a $60 reduction in compensation due to
high employee cash valuation of the benefit, the item is "costless" (and indeed has
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example, the "free" flight of an airline employee will entail costs
of meals, baggage handling, administration, and potential liability,
which the regulations would ignore. More importantly, the oppor-
tunity cost of employee standby privileges is equal to the revenue
foregone by not selling the remaining seats to employees and the
general public at a reduced rate. °4 Likewise, a retail employer,
even with unlimited inventory, forgoes additional revenue equal
to the amount above the discounted price that his employees would
be willing to pay for his merchandise.'0 5
It would be preferable to tax retail discounts and free flights
at fair market value. The allocative distortions and horizontal
inequity that result from taxing on a basis above employee cash
valuation could well be less than those from not taxing such bene-
fits. For instance, it seems likely that employee cash valuation
of a free airline flight will often be closer to the relevant mar-
ket value than to zero. It should be noted that as long as employee
valuation of free flights and retail goods exceeds the tax imposed
upon them, such in-kind compensation would continue to be given
if the cost to the employer of providing them were really zero. 0 6
Indeed, as long as employer cost were below employee after-tax
cash valuation, employees would continue to fill otherwise empty
airline seats. Certainly there is no significant administrative diffi-
culty in taxing either retail discounts or airline flights: in the
former case, the market value of the benefit would be the retail
cost of the merchandise obtained less the price paid; in the latter
case, the market value of the benefit would be the price of a
standby ticket.
B. The "Facts and Circumstances" Test
An incidental benefit failing to qualify under the "no cost"
rule may nevertheless escape taxation under the "facts and
circumstances" test. The draft regulations list nine circumstances,
any one of which is "a fact tending to indicate that the benefit does
not constitute compensation includable in gross income." "o7 No
a negative net cost) only in the sense that all activities undertaken by a profit-
maximizing employer are expected to be profitable.
'04 The example in the draft regulations states that the standby flights "do not
result in loss of revenue to the airline," Draft Treas. Reg. § z.61-16(f) (1), 40 Fed.
Reg. 41,118 (1975), but this is not true if the airline can legally charge its em-
ployees or other potential customers for such standby seating.
105 The example in the draft regulations states that no additional cost is incurred
because "the employer merely foregoes additional income." Id. § 1.61-6(f)(3).
But foregone income is as much a real cost as are out-of-pocket expenses, as the
example dealing with free standby flights implicitly recognizes, see note 104 supra.
106 See pp. 1144-45 supra.
'0' Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6-16(b), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (,975). It is stated
that "Etihe following factors, among others, shall be considered where present.
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principled explanation for these nine factors is provided other
than an expressed desire to codify existing practice. 108 This aim is
embodied in the final factor: that "the item generally is not thought
of as constituting [taxable] compensation." "I The other eight
factors, which are said to be applications of the ninth, 110 appear
to fall into three major categories. Two of the factors relate, al-
though quite imprecisely, to whether the benefit is appropriate and
helpful to the employer's business apart from any compensatory
value it may have. Another group encompasses benefits which
relieve the employee of unusual personal expenses which arise be-
cause of the nature of the employer's business. Finally, several
of the criteria merely describe situations in which taxpayers would
not be able to take abusive advantage of fringe benefits exclusions.
i. Appropriate and Helpful Benefits. -Perhaps the most
persuasive factor indicating exclusion is that the benefit in ques-
tion "accomodates an important requirement of the employer or
relieves the employer of significant expense or inconvenience." ill
It can be expected that most fringe benefits meeting this standard
will be appropriate and helpful to the employer's business, apart
from their contribution to compensation. However, as written, the
standard would allow easy circumvention of taxation unless "an
important requirement" is understood as excluding the necessity
of giving fringe benefits in order to attract 11 2 or to compensate
employees."' In any case, the language of this criterion could
lead to applications concerning specific fringe benefits that would
be at variance with the rules concerning deduction of analogous
expenditures. For instance, driving an automobile to work instead
of taking the bus may fulfill an important requirement of the em-
ployer in getting the employee to his job more quickly, but the em-
ployee nevertheless may not deduct such commuting expenses.
The presence of one or more of them will not necessarily be controlling . . . . The
failure of a benefit to qualify under one or more . . .- factors . . . may be a fact
tending to indicate that it does constitute compensation includible in gross income."
Id.
10 8 See pp. 1141-42 & note 6 supra.
109 Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(b)(9), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (975).
110 Treas. Exam., supra note x, at 77,619.
... Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(b)(S), 4o Fed. Reg. 41,Ix8 (975).
' 1 2 See p. 1i55 & note 52 supra. But cf. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(a)-z(b)(io)
(medical services and similar benefits of small value furnished "merely as a means
of promoting the health, goodwill, contentment, or efficiency" of employees need
not be included in wages for withholding purposes).
113 Thus, an expenditure might accomodate an important requirement of the
employer, but not be justified if it did not also contribute to employee compensation.
Under both the optimal tax scheme set forth in Part I and the business ration-
ality approach used for deductions, see pp. 1149-51 supra, the expenditure would
result in some taxable income to the employee.1
2
4 See PP. 1153-54 & note 44 supra.
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In light of the "important requirement" factor, it is difficult
to understand what is added by a second factor, that the
personal use occurs during, immediately before, or immediately
after working hours at or near the business premises of the em-
ployer and has a proximate relation to work performed by the
employee." 5
Such circumstances may be of some evidentiary value, indicating
whether a benefit is appropriate and helpful,"' but as here pre-
sented in the form of an independent standard, they could en-
compass benefits which would not qualify under the business ra-
tionality test. Thus, this factor would tend to indicate that no
income results from a daily swim and sauna in company facilities.
2. Unusually Costly Benefits. - The second group of factors
allows exclusion of benefits received because some aspect of the
taxpayer's employment gives rise to unusually high costs for items
"normally thought primarily personal." "I While there is some
precedent for this approach in the allowance of deductions for
certain moving,"" travel," 9 entertainment, 2 9 meals,' 2 ' and lodg-
ing 122 expenses, the draft regulations are of wider application
than are these deduction rules. For instance, one factor in the pro-
posed regulations allows exclusion of reimbursements for "pri-
marily personal" expenses when "a business requirement of the
employer prevented the employee from obtaining the item in the
ordinary manner." 123 Another factor would permit exclusion of
any benefit which insures "the employee's safety by protecting
against significant risk arising from the employment relation." 124
An example applying these tests concludes that an employee work-
ing a night shift who might normally take mass transit would not
115 Draft Tress. Reg. § i.6z-i6(b) (2), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (I975).
The examples citing this criterion are all cases in which provision of the
benefit in question is also said to fulfill an important employer requirement. These
examples include exclusion of supper money for late-working employees, chauf-
feured limousines for executives attending business appointments, parking for
employees who must use cars during the day, vehicles and drivers provided to
United States ambassadors for official purposes, a full-time car and driver provided
to a city fire chief, and payment by firms of bar association dues. See id. § T.61-
16 (f) (8) -(12), (I7).
"1Id. § i.6z-x6(b)(6).
118 All taxpayers, including those using the standard deduction, INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954, § 62(8), may deduct certain moving expenses. Id. § 217.
119 Id. § z62(a). See also id. § 274(c) (limiting deductibility of foreign travel).
120"Ordinary and necessary" entertainment expenses are deductible under §
162, subject to the limitations in § 274, see note 41 supra.
121 See note 43 supra.
122 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § x62(a).
" Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6r-i6(b) (6), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
'2 41d. § i.6i-i6(b)(7).
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be taxed on reimbursement of his taxi fare because of the danger
of returning home late by any other method.' 25 A second example
would allow exclusion of reimbursement of supper expenses and
taxi fare provided to an employee who works late because of the
exigencies of his employer's business. 20 The exclusion from gross
income of reimbursements for meals is inconsistent with section
119; 127 moreover, the Tax Court has recently held that supper ex-
penses cannot be deducted. 2 ' Similarly, taxi fare for the night
shift or late-working employee would be considered nondeductible
commuting expenses by both the IRS and the courts. Recent cases
have rejected deduction for greater than usual commuting expense,
whether necessitated by working late 129 or by the absence of resi-
dential neighborhoods near the taxpayer's place of work due to
the dangers associated with that work.3 0 Special hotel and apart-
ment expenses of late-working employees have also been held
nondeductible.1
31
A third factor would allow exclusion of a benefit similar to a
service "commonly provided by state or local governments in the
United States, but which is not readily available to the employees
because of the location of their employment." 132 Applying this
factor in an example, the draft regulations conclude that no gross
income is received by overseas employees whose children attend
a tuition-free "American-style" school maintained by their em-
ployer.'33 The principle underlying this exclusion may have been
that because local taxes that are used to provide various services
are deductible from gross income,'34 the provision of typical local
government services by an employer overseas, or in the United
States where the service is not governmentally provided, should
not be included in gross income.
While this principle does recognize the equivalent effect of
125 Id. § i.6-i6(f) (7).
... Id. § x.6-I6(f) (8).
127 INT. R Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 119. See p. IsI & note Si supra.
128 See Antos v. Commissioner, 9 CCH 1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. ff 7325
(Tax Ct. March 22, 1976). But see O.D. 514, 2 Cum. BuLL. 90 (3920) (supper
money for late-working employee is not taxable).
129 See Walter J. White, 41 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 11 72,o67 (972).
130 See United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 824 (ig6g). For further discussion of the issue of taxi fare reimbursement
and the safety factor generally, see Comments, Inst. for Pub. Interest Repres.,
supra note i, at 28-40.
1"1 See John S. Martin, 13 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 44,198 (1944) (hotel ex-
penses); Wilbur H. Clayton, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 48,104 (1948) (apartment
expenses).
... Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(b)( 4 ), 40 Fed. Reg. 4x,118 (1975).
...1d. § i.6i-x6(f)(i8).
134 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 164.
1166 [Vol. 89:1141
HeinOnline -- 89 Harv. L. Rev.  1166 1975-1976
FRINGE BENEFITS
exclusions and deductions, it also presents several difficulties.
First, many services provided by local governments may be
funded in part by federal monies; 135 federal income taxes, of
course, are not deductible.' Second, the principle has not been
applied to allow deductions in analogous situations. Even if a local
government does not provide for prekindergarten classes, storm
sewers, or road surfacing, expenditures on these items by indivi-
duals are not deductible. Third, like local taxes, foreign real
property and income taxes are deductible in determining federal
income tax liability.' While these foreign taxes might not be
used to provide the type of services desired by American employ-
ees, residents of the United States may also take jobs in areas
whose public schools they do not consider appropriate for their
children. Expenditures for private schooling, whether incurred
domestically or abroad, are nondeductible "personal, family, liv-
ing expenses." I'l
In one sense, the issue posed by these considerations is a "base-
line" problem: are there any services provided with untaxed
locally-raised revenue which are so necessary and universally
utilized that provision of them by an employer should also be left
untaxed? As with all baseline problems, horizontal inequity will
result whichever way the issue is resolved. If employer-provided
education is untaxed, the overseas employee may be better off
than a domestic employee who pays for private schooling; if the
education is taxed, the overseas employee may be worse off than
the domestic employee whose children attend public schools.
3. Benefits not Provided in a Flagrantly Abusive Manner.
The third, and most problematic, category of factors is apparently
intended to allow exclusion of fringe benefits when this would
not "threaten the integrity of the tax system." I" All three of the
criteria in this category would permit exclusion of some benefits
the taxation of which would pose no special administrative diffi-
culties and which neither are appropriate and helpful to the em-
ployer's business nor relate to special personal costs imposed on
the taxpayer by the employment relationship. The first criterion
is that the benefit is provided at a cost to the employer which is
' It is estimated that in fiscal year 1976, federal aid to state and local gov-
ernments will equal 34.3' of what those governments spend from their own
funds. See Advisory Comm. on Intergov'tal Relations, News Release, April 23,
1976.
... INT. REV. CODE OF X954, § 275.
127 Id. § 164. Foreign income taxes may alternatively be taken as a credit
against federal tax liability. Id. §§ 33, 901-03.
128 "Expenditures made by a taxpayer in obtaining an education . . .are not
deductible unless they qualify under Section 162 and § .1i62-5." Treas. Reg. §
1.262-I(b) (9). See pp. II54-55 & note So supra.
139 Treas. Exam., supra note i, at 77,620.
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insignificant compared with the fair market value of the benefit. 4 °
When cost is far below market value, it is likely that provision of
the benefit is not solely an attempt to enjoy the advantages of
untaxed forms of compensation. 4' Further, the number of items
for which an employer has such a natural cost advantage may be
fairly limited. While this criterion may therefore be indicative
of lack of abuse of the tax system, it may also, like the similar
"no cost" rule, have adverse effects on equity and efficiency. 4'
A second fact6r would tend to indicate exclusion when "the
benefit is provided to employees generally or to reasonable classi-
fications" thereof, but "not including classifications primarily in-
cluding only the most highly compensated employees." 113 Given
the objective of vertical equity, it may be appropriate to deny ex-
clusion when a benefit is furnished only to a group of highly-paid
employees. Still, provision to all or to a "reasonable classification"
of employees should not by itself tend to indicate excludability.
144
In fact, if an employer provides the same benefit to all his em-
ployees, vertical equity among them would be better advanced by
taxing the item.
The most puzzling of the nine criteria is that excludability will
tend to be warranted where "the benefit is not a substantial amount
absolutely or in comparison to the employee's stated compensa-
tion." 145 Clearly, a benefit which is absolutely or relatively large
should be carefully scrutinized if it does not readily appear to
qualify for exclusion under another factor. But apart from any
administrative difficulties in taxing small benefits, which are ad-
dressed by the de minimis rule, there is no compelling reason to
exclude smaller benefits from taxation. Further, it would be pos-
sible to receive a number of small benefits equaling in value a large
benefit which would not qualify under this factor. Another ob-
jection to this criterion is the vertical inequity resulting from com-
parison with stated compensation; a taxpayer making $3o,0oo per
"4'Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6x-6(b)(I), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,II8 (975). Another
part of this criterion states that exclusion will be indicated when the cost to the
employer "is not identifiable." Id. While inability to identify a basis for taxation
may pose significant administrative difficulties, inability to identify employer cost
as such appears irrelevant to whether the item should be subject to taxation.
141 See p. Iz44 supra.
4' See pp. 1161-62 supra.
14' Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-z6(b) (3), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (1975).
44 The only classification which the examples in the draft regulations conclude
is not reasonable is one primarily limited to company executives. Of course, even
if a benefit is provided to all employees of a company, exclusion will not be verti-
cally equitable in the tax system as a whole if most of the employees are highly
paid.
'14 Draft Treas. Reg. § x.6i-A6(b)(8), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,118 (975). No ex-
ample applying this factor is provided.
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year might be able to exclude a benefit for which a taxpayer whose
wage is $3.oo per hour would be taxed.
C. The De Minimis Exception
The draft regulations would permit exclusion from income of a
benefit when the item is "so small as to make accounting for it un-
reasonable or administratively impractical." 146 The evident effi-
ciency rationale for this principle makes it an appealing one. Un-
fortunately, the examples given of benefits which would qualify
as de minimis demonstrate that the Treasury would allow ex-
clusion of items whose accounting costs scarcely seem "unreason-
able." For example, bar association dues paid by the taxpayer's
law firm 11 and retail discounts given to employees 148 are both
cited as possible candidates for the de minimis exception. Yet it
would be simple for an employer to keep track of these readily
quantifiable items. Indeed, he will probably do so in any case for
tax deduction and internal cost accounting purposes.
IV. GUIDELINES FOR TAXATION OF INCIDENTAL
EMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
The Treasury's draft regulations are excessively permissive in
their approach to the taxation of incidental employment benefits.
Their presumption against taxation will tend to defeat not only
horizontal equity and allocative efficiency but also vertical equity,
an explicit objective of the draft regulations. Although assessing
the administrative cost of a less permissive approach is admittedly
difficult, it is clear that in several respects more comprehensive
taxation of fringe benefits would not be impracticable. At the very
least, tax treatment of fringe benefits could be more conducive
to equity and efficiency if, within practical limitations, this treat-
ment were consistent with the rules and principles relating to the
analytically analogous area of deductions.
But even the current treatment of deductions is too permissive
to the extent it allows appropriate and helpful expenses to be de-
ducted regardless of the personal benefits associated with them.
Thus, it is suggested that in both the fringe benefit and employ-
ment expense areas, the IRS and the courts should be more per-
sistent in taxing an item when its personal benefit is at least as
great as its market cost. One way of addressing this issue is to
consider whether the item might have been purchased for per-
...ld. § i.6i-i6(c).
1, 7 Id. § i.6-i6(f) (17).
4' See id. § i.6i-i6(f) (3).
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sonal reasons by the employee if it were not provided by the em-
ployer or did not have business value to the employee.
The following are suggested rules for implementation of a more
equitable and efficient approach to the taxation of incidental em-
ployment benefits: "'
(a) Generally, a benefit should be excluded from gross income
if it is necessary to the proper performance of the employee's job
and it is unlikely that its personal value approximates its market
value. The principle underlying this rule is exclusion of benefits
when they are appropriate and helpful to the employer's business
apart from contribution to compensation, unless it appears that
their full value should be taxed because they confer significant
personal benefits. The first part of the rule is an extension of the
test used in current regulations dealing with exclusion of lodging
which the employee is required to accept."' As in the case of lodg-
ing, an "objective" standard should be used to determine whether
a particular benefit is necessary to proper job performance. 1 '
While the rule is similar to the two "appropriate and helpful"
factors of the draft regulations, it is less inclusive, for it encom-
passes neither benefits which are provided to encourage an em-
ployee to perform his job 112 nor benefits of relatively great per-
sonal value.
(b) When a benefit is both necessary to the employee's per-
formance of his job and compensates him for that performance,
it should be allocated between these two functions to the extent
feasible. Generally, as in the area of deductions, this allocation
will be easiest if the time the benefit is used for personal reasons
149 These rules may allow more items to be excluded by employees using the
standard deduction, see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 141-45, than these employees
may take in the form of itemized deductions. Taxpayers using the standard de-
duction may additionally deduct only those items specifically mentioned in § 62.
In effect, § 62 disallows all trade or business deductions by taxpayers whose sole
trade or business consists of being an employee, except for expenses allowed under
§ i62 relating to transportation or travel (including meals and lodging expenses)
or which are reimbursements by the employer. The reasoning behind these limita-
tions may be twofold. To some extent, the standard deduction may be considered a
substitute for business as well as personal deductions. However, the deductibility
of all business reimbursements, not just those related to transportation and travel,
suggests that another concern may be that employee expense records are not usually
well-documented. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-17, T.D. 6630, 1963-1 Cum. BuLL. 58,
68-69 (1962) (concern evidenced by special and simplified substantiation require-
ments for employees).1S See p. ii5g supra.
' See note 54 supra.
1
1
2 For example, Draft Treas. Reg. § x.61-i6(f) (8), 40 Fed. Reg. 41,ri8 (975),
would allow exclusion of taxi fare provded for an employee who works late be-
cause of the press of an employer's business. Taxi fare would not be excluded under
the rules proposed in this Note.
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does not overlap the time it is used for business reasons. 5 ' For
instance, an employee's use of a company car on weekends can
be regarded as an entirely taxable benefit,'54 regardless of the
complexities of dealing with the car's weekday use by the taxpayer.
(c) If personal value does not approximate market value and
allocation is not feasible, the benefit should be excluded from em-
ployee income only if the employee uses it primarily in perform-
ance of his job. This rule, of course, is similar to the primary pur-
pose test applied in the deduction area. Since by its own terms
this rule is not applied except where allocation cannot be made,
accurate determination of the primary purpose of a particular item
will seldom be possible. However, the rule is not without sub-
stantive content, for it does at the very least require a convincing
demonstration of a legitimate non-compensatory business reason
for providing the item.
(d) Where the cost of accounting for and taxing a benefit is
unreasonably large compared with its value, the benefit may be
excluded from gross income. This de minimis exception largely
parallels that of the draft regulations ' but should be applied
more sparingly than it is in the examples in the regulations.'
Where the employer is likely to have records documenting the
recipients and value of a benefit, this de minimis rule will rarely
apply. Moreover, even though daily accounting for a small bene-
fit may be impractical, the benefit might not qualify under the
de minimis exception if it is given on a regular basis, because a
fair estimation of its annual value need not be unreasonably
costly to make.'57 More generally, the rule will be subject to abuse
unless the IRS does not hestitate to tax relatively larger amounts
on the basis of somewhat rougher estimates of their magnitude.
(e) Where it is well-established that a given item is not de-
ductible when purchased by an employee, the item should be in-
cluded in gross income when provided by the employer. Certain
expenses which are arguably necessary for the proper performance
of the employee's job and that may in certain cases have insig-
nificant personal value, such as commuting costs, have unambigu-
1
53 See p. 1151 supra.
14 The draft regulations would not tax such use, under the "no substantial
cost" rule. Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-i6(f) (1S), 40 Fed. Reg. 4,118 (,975).
... Id. § i.6I-I6(c).
x See p. 1169 supra.
157 Other types of benefits which may be difficult to estimate and to account for
have been held includible in gross income. See Mendelson v. Commissioner, 305
F.2d 519 (7th Cir.) (estimate by IRS of income from tips, where taxpayer kept
no records, held includible in gross income), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962);
Maxwell H. Messenger, 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1277 (1969) (court accepted IRS's
"tip factor" equalling io% of gross receipts).
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ously been held nondeductible. 5  Such rules should, without fur-
ther analysis, be applied in taxing fringe benefits in order to avoid
providing an incentive for in kind provision of these nondeductible
items, and to avoid inequity between the employee who wishes to
deduct an item and the employee who wishes to exclude a similar
item from gross income.
(f) Fringe benefits which are to be included in gross income
should be assessed at their fair market value where possible. The
only two measures of the value of in-kind compensation which
appear administratively workable are employer cost and fair mar-
ket value.'59 Neither of these will be a consistently fair approxi-
mation of employee valuation. Measurement on the basis of em-
ployer cost will typically result in undertaxation, while assessment
at fair market value will often result in overtaxation.' ° But use
of the fair market value standard in the context of the rules sug-
gested above need not be considered unduly harsh, since under
these rules the personal value of some job-related benefits will in-
evitably escape taxation. Moreover, it will generally be easier to
estimate fair market value than to estimate per-employee cost in-
curred by the employer in providing the specific benefit sought to
be taxed. However, when fair market value cannot be easily de-
termined except with reference to employer cost, employer cost
may become the basis for measurement."'
V. CONCLUSION
The premises of the six rules described above are that inci-
dental employment benefits should be treated in the same way as
employment-related expenses unless practical considerations pro-
hibit like treatment,0 " and that, to the extent possible, neither ex-
158 See notes 44, 129 to 13o supra.
159 Only one decision has used taxpayer cash valuation as the basis for measure-
ment of income from in-kind benefits, see Reginald Turner, x3 T.C. Mem. 462,
463 (1954). It has been suggested that fair market value discounted by an arbi-
trary percentage should be used to estimate income received from certain in-kind
benefits. See Guttentag, Leonard & Rodewald, Federal Income Taxation of Fringe
Benefits: A Specific Proposal, 6 NAT'L TAX J. 250, 253 (1953).
260 See note 72 supra.
161 The courts have sometimes used cost as an approximation of value. See
United Aniline Co. v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 7oi (ist Cir. x963); John L. Ashby,
50 T.C. 409 (x968).
162 Under the six rules proposed in this Note, benefits which are analogous to
personal itemized deductions, such as imputed interest on interest-free loans,
"matching" charitable contributions by an employer, and medical services not ex-
cluded under §§ IO4-o5, would be included in gross income. Since there are restric-
tions on the deductibility of interest, see INT. REV. CODE OF x954, § 163, charitable
contributions, see id. § I7o, and medical expenses, see id. § 213, and since taxpayers
using the standard deductions may not take such itemized deductions, it is appro-
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clusions nor deductions should be vehicles by which personal bene-
fits escape taxation. The premise of the draft regulations, on the
other hand, is that fringe benefits should not be excluded from tax-
ation unless to do so would "threaten the integrity" of the tax
system. The approach of the draft regulations thus seems to serve
primarily the objective of administrative convenience. The integ-
rity of a system of taxation, however, depends to a large extent
on the vigor with which it pursues the values of horizontal and
vertical equity and allocative efficiency. The rules proposed in
this Note should promote these objectives without imposing unac-
ceptable administrative costs.
priate to include these benefits in gross income, allowing the employee to determine
their taxability according to the specific rules relating to the deductibility of each
This is the approach taken in the draft regulations with respect to employer-
provided daycare services. See Draft Treas. Reg. § i.6i-6(f)(I9), 40 Fed. Reg.
41,118 (1975). But see J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (ig6i) (interest-free loan
from employer does not give rise to gross income).
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